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Abstract
We study a routing game in which one of the players
unilaterally acts altruistically by taking into consideration
the latency cost of other players as well as his own. By
not playing selfishly, a player can not only improve the
other players’ equilibrium utility but also improve his own
equilibrium utility. To quantify the effect, we define a met-
ric called the Value of Unilateral Altruism (VoU) to be the
ratio of the equilibrium utility of the altruistic user to the
equilibrium utility he would have received in Nash equilib-
rium if he were selfish. We show by example that the VoU,
in a game with nonlinear latency functions and atomic
players, can be arbitrarily large. Since the Nash equilib-
rium social welfare of this example is arbitrarily far from
social optimum, this example also has a Price of Anarchy
(PoA) that is unbounded. The example is driven by there
being a small number of players since the same example
with non-atomic players yields a Nash equilibrium that is
fully efficient.
1. Introduction
The topic of network routing games has been studied
extensively in recent years (e.g. [1–3]). Some of these in-
vestigations consider network games for which there are
so many users that the traffic of each user can be consid-
ered negligible – the players for such games are said to
be non atomic. Other work considers routing games for
which each player is the source of a significant amount of
the network’s traffic. These players are said to be atomic.
The analysis of atomic routing games can be more com-
plex than that of non atomic games since the routing choice
of a single player can affect the delays seen by others.
The Price of Anarchy (PoA) [4] is one popular mea-
sure of the efficiency of equilibria for such games. It is
defined as the ratio of the maximum social welfare that
could be achieved if a social planner selected the strategies
of all players versus the lowest social welfare achieved in
Nash equilibrium. The literature shows that in many cases
the PoA can be arbitrarily large, although there are sev-
eral important classes of examples in which the PoA can
be bounded. (For example, Roughgarden [5], shows that
routing games with non-atomic users and affine latency
functions have a PoA of no more than 4/3.)
Naturally if players were not selfish, but instead all
were striving to maximize social welfare, the equilibrium
welfare could be much more efficient. However, an in-
teresting question is what would happen if just one player
chose not to be selfish and instead takes actions that con-
sider the welfare of other players – in other words if he be-
haves altruistically. In this work we investigate the effects
of unilateral altruism. We find by way of example that the
effect of unilateral altruism can be arbitrarily large.
A selfish user chooses a path (or a set of paths) that
minimizes his total cost without considering that their se-
lection may degrade the performance of the other users
in the system. However in practice players may not play
like this. Experimental studies [6–8] have shown that even
in simple games in a controlled environment, players do
not always act selfishly, for example they can show reci-
procity, act out of spite, or be altruistic. Several explana-
tions have been considered for such behaviour of players.
Fehr [9, 10] argues that players act out of a perception of
fairness and thus they consider a utility function that cap-
tures the costs of other players. Models of altruism and
spite are discussed in [7, 8, 11, 12] etc. Most of the re-
lated models are discussed by Sobel in [6]. The fact that
the social welfare observed in experimental trials is often
better than that predicted by finding the Nash equilibrium
of a model with selfish players is one reason to consider a
model in which players act out of altruism. Since the play-
ers often interact over a longer period than that modeled
in a one-shot game, players have a reason to play more
cooperatively.
In this work, we focus on altruistic behaviour with
atomic users. We consider a simple model where the per-
ceived cost of a user is a linear combination of the other
user’s cost, as we proposed in [13]. We show that unilat-
erally altruism drastically increases the altruistic player’s
equilibrium utility. It is obvious that if all players are altru-
istic then the equilibrium utility can be improved, however
it is surprising to observe a large improvement by a single
player’s altruistic action. However, it needs to be empha-
sized that the improvement only happens if the other play-
ers change their strategies in accordance with the belief
that the altruistic player will truly be altruistic. In some
sense, the altruistic player has to “credibly commit” to be-
ing altruistic.
In section 2 we present the system model and key defi-
nitions. We present an example to motivate the problem by
showing very high price of anarchy in section 3. Section
4 analyzes a two user selfish game. In section 5, we in-
troduce and analyze the altruistic routing game. In section
6, we extend our model to a more general topology with n
nodes and investigate the impact of altruism. Finally, we
summarize with concluding remarks in section 7. We skip
several details and proofs in the extended abstract due to
space limitation, these details are made available at [14].
2. Basic Definitions and System Model
We consider a network G = (V ,L ), where a set
of nodes V are connected by set of directed links L ⊆
V ×V . We denote vs ∈ S ⊆ V ,vd ∈ D ⊆ V distinct
nodes that are called source nodes and destination nodes,
respectively. A route R∈R is a directed path with distinct
nodes that connects a source and a destination. For every
link l ∈L and a route R, we write l ∈ r whenever l is a
part of route R.
A set I = {1,2, ..., I} of users share the network
(V ,L ). We consider that each source node vs is asso-
ciated with a user i, which ships a throughput demand of
average data rate ri to a common destination associated
with node vd . User i splits its fixed demand ri among the
paths (routes) connecting the source to the destination, so
as to optimize some individual performance objective. We
assume that there exist at least one route from vs to vd .
Let xil denote the expected flow that user i sends on
link l. The vector of flows xi = (xil)l∈L that user i sends
onto each path is called the routing strategy of user i. The
set of strategies of user i that satisfy the user’s demand and
preserve its flow at all nodes is called the strategy space of
user i and is denoted by Xi, that is:
Xi = {xi ∈ R|L |; ∑
l∈Out(v)
xil = ∑
l∈In(v)
xil + r
i
v,v ∈ V },
where ris = ri,rid =−ri and riv = 0 for v 6= vs,vd and Out(v)
and In(v) the set of out-going and in-coming links, re-
spectively. The system flow configuration x = (x1, ...,xI)
is called a routing strategy profile and takes values in the
product strategy space X =⊗i∈I Xi.
Every link l ∈ L is associated with a separable la-
tency cost function Tl(xl) : R →R which is assumed to be
piecewise differentiable, convex, increasing, and Tl(xl) ≥
0 for every xl > 0. The queueing network interpretation is
that Tl(xl) is the delay incurred by traffic crossing link l,
or alternatively it can be read as the cost per unit of traffic
when the load in link l is xl .
Latency function: We consider the following latency
function types in this paper:
A : Affine: Tl(xl) = axl + b, where a,b≥ 0.
E : Elbow function: We define the func-
tion with offset o in parametric form as
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Figure 1. Network topology and Latency function
Tl(xl) = max
(
o,
( L
δ
)
(x− r)+L
)
. Unless stated
otherwise, we use o = 0,0 < δ ≪ 1, refer to Fig. 2.
The E type latency function posses several features that
makes in mathematically tractable, e.g., piece-wise lin-
earity, convexity. It turns out that a steep slope of el-
bow function causes users to react for even small flow
changes which plays a key role in the latter sections. This
is why, we designed the elbow function in a way so that
the per-unit cost of traffic can increase very rapidly. This
is also not unlike the delay in most queueing models such
as M/M/1 delay function.
Load Balancing (LB) Network: We introduced a
network topology called the “load balancing network”
[13], where two users located one at each of the two nodes,
called source nodes, deliver their demand to a common
destination node as pictured in Fig. 1(a).
In this paper, we associate E type latency with l1, l2
while we associate A type latency with l12, l21. One of
the reasons of such modeling is that, typically source-
destination links are standard queueing network links with
limited capacity (approximated by E type). The intercon-
necting/cross links are meant for balancing skewed loads
on the local links. Thus, it is of high capacity but are ex-
pensive by provision (approximated by type A).
User Cost: Let Ji(x) be the cost of user i under rout-
ing strategy profile x. The total cost to user i is the sum of
the separable link costs, given as
Ji(x) = ∑
l
xilTl(xl), for each i. (1)
The objective of each user i is to find an admissible rout-
ing strategy xi ∈ Xi so as to minimize his cost. Later we
consider altruistic users, where the objective function takes
into account of other user’s cost also.
2.1. Nash equilibrium
Each user in this framework minimizes his own cost
functions which leads to the concept of Nash equilibrium.
The minimization problem here depends on the routing de-
cision of other users, i.e., their routing strategy
x−i = (x1, ...,xi−1,xi+1, ...xI),
Definition 2.1 A vector x˜i, i = 1,2, ..., I is called a Nash
equilibrium if for each user i, x˜i minimizes the cost func-
tion given that other users’ routing decisions are x˜ j, j 6= i.
In other words,
Ji(x˜1, x˜2, ..., x˜I) = min
xi∈Xi
Ji(x˜1, x˜2, ...,xi, ..., x˜I),
i = 1,2, ..., I, (2)
where Xi is the routing strategy space of user i.
Social Optimum: A centralized or coordinated solu-
tion is referred to as social optimum1, which can be ex-
pressed as:
xOPT = argmin
x∈X
∑
i
Ji(x). (3)
Price of Anarchy (PoA): A well known way to quan-
tify the equilibrium inefficiency of a non-cooperative game
(in the sense of [4]). The Price of Anarchy is defined
( [2, 4]) as the ratio of worst case cost at Nash equilib-
rium when users are selfish to the cost at social optimum.
Therefore,
PoA = sup
x∈xSE
∑i Ji(x)
∑i Ji(xOPT )
. (4)
where xSE denotes the set of equilibrium flow configura-
tions when users are “selfish”.
3. Motivating Example
In this section we illustrate the inefficiency of non-
cooperative equilibrium with the help of a simple example
and point out the key reason for the inefficiency to moti-
vate the detailed investigation. We also note that the inef-
ficiency appears only for the atomic users.
Consider a LB network (in Fig. 1(a)) with two self-
ish users, u1 and u2, at source nodes 1 and 2 respectively,
having identical demand rates r1 = r2 = r, which is to be
dispatched to the destination node 3. Since, link l1 is the
most direct way for user 1 to reach the destination, we re-
fer to link l1 his “local link”. Similarly, we refer to link
l2 as user 2’s local link. We refer to links l12 and l21 as
“cross” links.
Example: Let the latency function be as shown in
Fig. 2, which is expressed as:
Tl(x) =
{
max(0,L2(x)), for l = l1, l2
c, for l = l12, l21.
(5)
We can easily observe that the social optimum is achieved
when users use only local links. This is so because any
positive flow on cross links add additional latency while
retaining the total latency (due to flow) on links l1 and l2
remains unchanged. However, when users are selfish, each
1Existence of minima is due to compact strategy set and piece-wise
continuous cost function. It is unique because of potential function struc-
ture.
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Figure 2. Link latency function: L2(x) = Lδ (x− r)+
L, for r− δ ≤ x and the parameters are: r = 1,L =
0.1,δ = 10−3,g = Lδ = 100.
user optimize its own utility. We illustrate by way of itera-
tively finding the best responses of the two selfish players
why they end up putting a large fraction of their traffic on
the cross links, which is the cause of inefficiency.
Let the initial flow be {r,r}, and the corresponding
initial cost of users are {L,L} = {0.1,0.1}. Let u1 pushes
δ amount of flow to l2 to bring his local link flow below
the knee (see Fig. 2 ), which results in T1(.) = 0. On the
other hand, the total flow in l2 raised to r+δ which results
in T2(.) = L+ Lδ δ = 2L. The updated cost of u1 is J1 =
δc+δ ·2L= 0.12, which is much lower than previous cost
0.1. However, the cost of u2 has increased from 0.1 to (1−
10−3) ≈ 0.2, almost doubled. In turn u2 will reciprocate
by pushing 2δ unit of flow to l1 to bring his local link
latency below the knee, which reduces his cost drastically
to 2δ · (2L+ c) ≈ 0.003, but raises the cost of u1 to (1−
δ )2L+ δc ≈ 0.2. Due to this raise in cost, again u1 will
push 2δ amount of flow to l2 in order to bring his local link
latency below the knee. This process will keep repeating
till the flow configuration reaches to xSE ≈{0.5,0.5}, after
which none of the users benefit by deviating even a small
amount of traffic from their local link. In other words, xSE
is the Nash equilibrium. The total cost incurred by any
user at xSE is≈ 0.5 ·(0.1+1)= 0.55, which is much higher
(≈ 50 times) than the cost at social optimum (= 0.1), i.e.,
PoA≈ 50.
We demonstrated by a simple LB Network example
that selfish routing with atomic users can be significantly
inefficient. In the following, we show that it can be even
worse and can be arbitrarily large for atomic users. We
also show that this is not the case with non-atomic users,
suggesting that it is the ability of a user to chase the latency
of the links with his strategy that drives the example.
4. Two User Symmetric Game
In this section we establish results showing the ineffi-
ciency of selfish routing games by analyzing the two user
LB network game. In the later sections, we construct and
analyze the model in which users are altruistic, which ex-
poses our key findings.
We consider a sequence of LB network examples in-
dexed by m ≥ 1. Consider a LB Network of three nodes
as shown in Fig. 1(a) with the E type and A type latency
functions as follows:
Tl(x) =
{
max
(
0,
(
L
δm
)
(x− r)+L
)
, for l1, l2,
cm, for l12, l21.
(6)
where cm > L > δm > 0 and cm < r Lδm for all m . The
sequence δm decreases and tends to zero such that the gra-
dient Lδm → ∞ as m → ∞. Similarly, cm is an increasing
sequence such that latency of cross link can be made very
high for sufficiently large m. One example of such se-
quence can be δm = δ m and cm = cm. It turns out to be
important that the gradient Lδm be larger than the cross-link
latency cm, but the cross-link latency cm be bigger than the
latency of the local links when the flow is r, which is L.
Using (1), the cost of users are given by,
Ji(x) = xiiTi(xi)+ x¯ii(Ti j(x¯ii)+Tj(x j)), for i, j = 1,2. (7)
where, x¯ii = ri − xii We often denote Tli(.) by Ti(.) for the
ease of notation.
4.1. Selfish Routing Game with Atomic Users
Lemma 4.1 Consider two atomic users of identical de-
mands on a load balancing network (Fig. 1(a)) at node 1
and node 2 with the associated latency given by (6). In the
two user selfish routing game, there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium, given by
xSE = {x1
∗
1 ,x
2∗
2 }= {r/2+ ζm,r/2+ ζm} , (8)
JSEi = rL+(r/2− ζm)cm, for i = 1,2. (9)
where ζm = 12 ( cmL/δm ) is the ratio of unit latency of cross
links to the marginal latency of local links. By abuse of
notation, above we denoted xSE as the equilibrium flow.
The proof of Lemma 4.1 uses techniques of Non Zero
Sum Games (NZSG) [15]. We solve the game by explicitly
computing the best responses and finding their intersection
(refer [14]).
Proposition 4.1 The Price of Anarchy of two atomic
users on LB network (Fig. 1(a)) with the associated el-
bow latency function of (6) and with identical demands is
given by
PoA =
[
1+
( r2 − ζm)cm
rL
]
. (10)
The PoA can be arbitrarily large for large enough m.
The proof is based on Lemma 4.1 (see [14] for de-
tails).
4.2. Selfish Routing Game with Non-Atomic
Users
We consider large number of selfish users at each
nodes. The demand of each user is assumed very small
such that choice of a single user has negligible impact on
the system performance. The latency observed by a user is
the sum of the link latency that a user traverse to reach to
the destination node. Each user would choose a route so
as to minimize its latency at equilibrium.
Proposition 4.2 The Price of Anarchy for the routing
game on the LB network with non-atomic selfish users and
associated latency given by (6) and with identical demands
is equal to 1 for any m.
The bounded PoA is achieved because the user’s use only
their local links. This is because the latency observed by
a user via a cross link is larger as compared to the case
when he chose his local link. However, such direct intu-
ition is not possible in case of atomic users. The proof of
Lemma 4.2 is based on variational inequality at Wardrop
equilibrium in the similar lines of [2] (see [14]).
Interestingly, the social welfare for selfish routing
games with atomic users is unbounded whereas in similar
settings it corresponds to social optimum for non-atomic
users.
5. Altruistic Routing Game
In this section, we consider routing games when users
are not entirely selfish, but rather altruistic. Each user min-
imizes the perceived cost, a weighted sum of his own cost
and other users’ cost (we proposed this model in [13]). The
weight coefficient is called degree of Cooperation (DoC).
Definition 5.1 Let α ik be the degree of cooperation of user
i with user k. The perceived cost is a convex combination
of the users’ cost from the set I as follows:
ˆJi(x,~αi) = ∑
k∈I
α ikJk(x); ∑
k
α ik = 1, i = 1, ...|I |. (11)
We can express the DoC vector of user i as
−→
α i =
(α i1, · · · ,α
i
|I |). Based on the DoC, we can view the fol-
lowing properties for user i,
• Non-cooperative: if α ik = 0, for allk 6= i. Denote the
DoC of a selfish user by~ei = {0, · · · ,eii, · · · ,0}, where
eii = 1.
• Altruistic: User i is fully cooperative with all users
and does not care for his benefits, i.e., α ii = 0.
• Equally-cooperative: if α ij =
1
|I | , ∀ j ∈ I , user i is
equally cooperative with each user.
Note that, although a user cooperates with others, he
minimizes his own perceived cost. Therefore, this for-
mulation allows us to analyze the game using the con-
ventional techniques of non cooperative game theory, e.g.,
Nash equilibrium, etc.
5.1. Unilateral Altruism
We call user i unilaterally altruistic, if he cooper-
ates with other users irrespective of whether the other users
are cooperative or non cooperative with user i. More pre-
cisely, let all users j 6= i be selfish and user i be unilater-
ally altruistic with degree of cooperation vector ~αi, then
~α = {~e1, · · · ,~αi, · · · ,~e|I |}. The perceived cost by user i
and user j 6= i can be expressed as
ˆJi(x,~αi) = ∑
k∈I
α ikJk(x), ˆJ j(x,~e j) = J j(x). (12)
Let xSE denote the set of Nash equilibrium flow
vectors for the selfish routing game. Then, the best
selfish Nash equilibrium flow can be given by xSE =
argminx∈xSE ˆJi(x,~ei). Similarly, let xAL~αi be the set of Nash
equilibrium flows2 (using (12)) when user i is unilaterally
altruistic with DoC ~αi and all the other users are selfish.
Recall that, an altruistic player truly commits his strategy
to be altruistic such that the other players can change their
strategy in accordance to this belief.
Definition 5.2 (VoU) We quantify the benefit of unilateral
altruism by the term Value of Unilateral Altruism (VoU),
which is defined as the ratio of the best selfish equilibrium
cost to his best equilibrium cost when he is unilaterally
altruistic. Mathematically, we can express
VoU(i) =
Ji(xSE)
inf(~αi,xAL~αi )
Ji(xAL~αi )
(13)
Notice that the equilibrium is obtained based on minimiza-
tion of perceived cost but the VoU is related to the actual
cost incurred by the user. By VoU we identify the bound
on the improvement that a user may achieve by becom-
ing altruistic (if altruism is beneficial for the user). Note
that, when there exists unique equilibrium with an altru-
istic user, the VoU corresponds to the ~αi that minimizes
the equilibrium cost. However, when there exist multiple
equilibria, the VoU corresponds to the best equilibria at its
corresponding~αi. By definition, we have xSE ⊆ xAL~αi , there-
fore the feasible values of VoU(i) must be ≥ 1. The case
of VoU(i) = 1 indicates, either no improvement or degra-
dation with altruism as compared to the selfish situation.
The more interesting is the case of VoU(i)> 1, which cor-
responds to the situation when a unilaterally altruistic user
improves his cost as compared to he being selfish. This is
non-intuitive, as an altruistic user is generally expected to
incur more cost. In the following, we illustrate that one
can achieve drastic improvement by being unilaterally al-
truistic.
Proposition 5.1 Suppose user 1 is altruistic in a two user
routing game on a LB Network (Fig. 1(a)) with the as-
sociated latency given by (6) and with identical demand.
The “Value of unilateral altruism” of user 1, VoU(1), is
arbitrarily large for sufficiently large m.
Below we provide a brief sketch of the proof (re-
fer [14] for details). The selfish users incur unbounded
2Existence of equilibrium with unilateral altruism is guaranteed since
the strategy set is compact and continuous, and the cost function is con-
cave [15].
cost at equilibrium (unique), see Lemma 4.1. There-
fore, a bounded equilibrium cost of user 1 with his uni-
lateral altruism implies the proposition. However, there
can be multiple equilibria with altruism but due to un-
bounded JSE1 (.), the VoU(1) still remains unbounded even
if there exist other better equilibrium. Using these argu-
ments we show VoU(1) is unbounded. In fact, we show
that (x1∗1 ,x2
∗
2 ) = (r,r− δ ) is an equilibrium with unilateral
altruism for a set of α ∈ Γ. The users cost is unbounded
for this equilibrium, which concludes the proof.
Note that by showing unilateral altruism, not only the
altruistic user is able to improve his cost by keeping it
bounded, rather the other selfish user also enjoy his im-
proved cost which also remains bounded. This way, even
the selfish user also get drastic benefit due to altruistic
user’s action.
6. VoU for N players
From the discussion of previous sections, one might
think that the benefit of altruism (the unbounded VoU) is
restricted to two user scenario and it may disappear for a
larger number of users. In this spirit we investigate for n
user game in this section. We are able to construct a LB
type network of n+1 nodes, shown in Figs. 1(a), on which
the property of unbounded VoU is retained when a user is
unilaterally altruistic.
Consider that n users (a user at each node) have iden-
tical demands to be dispatched to a common destination
node (marked as n+ 1th node). We compute the selfish
routing game performance and subsequently study the per-
formance with an altruistic user. It is intuitive that if all
users turn altruistic then the efficiency of selfish equilib-
rium can be improved. In the earlier sections we studied
the game with two users. However, it is more complex to
study for n users. We chose a symmetric network, which
is more tractable. We find that even in case of n users,
the benefit of a single user’s altruism is significant. We
formally establish our findings with the help from the fol-
lowing lemma and proposition.
1 2
n+1
l1
ln
nl12 · · ·
r1
rn
r2
l21
l j1
l1 j
Figure 3. A LB type network with n source nodes
and a destination node.
Lemma 6.1 The PoA for the n player selfish routing game
on a LB network (Fig. 3) with the latency function as in
(6), and with identical demands is arbitrarily large for suf-
ficiently large m.
The proof follows by first showing unique equilibrium by
transforming the network into a two node network with
parallel links. Exploiting the symmetric structure, we ob-
tain the NEP for selfish users and also for the social opti-
mum.
Proposition 6.1 Consider a user (say user 1) being uni-
laterally altruistic while other n users are selfish in a LB
network (Fig. 3), where all other users are selfish users
with identical demands and latency as in (6). The “Value
of unilateral altruism” of the altruistic user, VoU(1), is
arbitrarily large for sufficiently large m.
The proof follows the similar techniques as that in propo-
sition 5.1 and using lemma 6.1.
7. Concluding Remarks and Perspective
Our investigation in this work reveals the benefits of
unilateral altruism in a network routing game. We showed
with the help of a simple example with two users that if one
user becomes altruistic, his equilibrium utility drastically
improves. An improvement by unilateral altruism is itself
non-intuitive. Moreover, the improvement by altruism is
drastic, which is quite surprising. To quantify this we pro-
posed a metric, “Value of Unilateral Altruism”. Latter, we
also show that the benefit of unilateral altruism is visible
for a larger number of players.
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.1. Proof for Lemma 4.1
Proof: The Nash equilibrium for the selfish game corre-
sponds to the solution to the following minimization prob-
lem
P2 : x
i∗ = argmin
xi∈Xi
Ji(xi,x−i), ∀ i = 1,2. (14)
The cost of user 1 and 2 in the above equation can be ex-
pressed as follows:
J1(x) = x11T1(x1)+ x¯11(T12(x¯11)+T2(x2)), (15)
J2(x) = x22T2(x2)+ x¯22(T21(x¯22)+T1(x1)). (16)
where x¯ii = r− xii for i = 1,2.
The compactness of the strategy set X with the con-
cavity and continuity of the objective function Ji(.) imply
the existence of a Nash equilibrium (see [15, Thm. 4.4]).
A formal proof of existence is provided in [13]. We pro-
vide the proof of unique Nash equilibrium for a general n
node LB network (n user) in Lemma 6.1. Therefore, we
conclude that there exist unique equilibrium for the prob-
lem P1, as it is a special case of Lemma 6.1 with n = 2.
Therefore, if we can compute a Nash equilibrium, then that
is the only Nash equilibrium. We can observe that a sym-
metric Nash equilibrium exist due the symmetric structure
of P1. In the following, we compute the symmetric Nash
equilibrium.
.1.1. Computation of symmetric Nash equilibrium.
We compute the best response for each player to compute
the equilibrium. The best responses can be given by the
following expressions
BR1(x22) = argmin
0≤x1∗≤r1
J1(x1,x2) = max{min{0,a∗},r},
BR2(x11) = argmin
0≤x2∗≤r2
J2(x1,x2) = max{min{0,b∗},r}.
(17)
where (with some abuse of notation3) we denote the in-
ternal solutions by a∗ and b∗. By the internal solution,
we mean 0 < a∗(or b∗) < r when a∗ ⇒ ∂J1(x)
x11
= 0 and
b∗⇒ ∂J2(x)
x22
= 0. Equating the above and doing some sim-
ple calculus we obtain,
a∗(x22) =
F(x2)+ (cm + rg(x2))
G(x) ,
b∗(x11) =
F(x1)+ (cm + rg(x1))
G(x)
(18)
where, F(x2) = T2(x2) − T1(x1) = −F(x1), g1(x1) =
∂Tl1 (x1)
∂x1 , g2(x2) =
∂T2(x2)
∂x2 , and G(x) = g1(x1)+g2(x2). The
gradient of T1(x) at r is g1(r) = L/δm.
3a∗ is represented in short for a∗(x22) and b∗ in short for b∗(x11).
Exploiting the symmetry we note x1 = x2 = r, g(x1) =
g(x2) = g(r), and F(x1) = F(x2) = 0 at equilibrium.
Therefore, the equilibrium flow can be given by
x1
∗
1 = x
2∗
2 =
cm
2g(r)
+
rg(r)
2g(r)
=
r
2
+ ζm (19)
where ζm = 12
(
cm
L/δm
)
. The Nash equilibrium flow for self-
ish users is expressed as xSE = { r2 +ζm, r2 +ζm}. Note thatζm ≥ 0 for large enough m.
2) Using (19), the equilibrium cost can be given by
JSE1 =
( r
2
+ ζm
)
T1(x1)+
( r
2
− ζm
)(
T12
( r
2
− ζm
)
+T2(x2)
)
= rL+
( r
2
− ζm
)
cm. (20)
This concludes the proof. ⋄
.2. Proof for Proposition 4.1
Proof: Recall that the definition of price of anarchy from
(4)
PoA = sup
x∈xSE
∑i Ji(x)
∑i Ji(xOPT )
. (21)
One can easily observe that at social optimum (OPT)
only local links are used. Therefore, the user cost JOPTi at
social optima is given as
JOPT1 = rT1(r) = rL. (22)
Therefore, the price of anarchy for any m can be given by
PoA =
rL+
(
r
2 − ζm
)
cm
rL
=
[
1+
( r2 − ζm)cm
rL
]
. (23)
Note that cm is an increasing sequence and ζm is a decreas-
ing sequence. Hence, PoA can be arbitrary large for large
enough m. ⋄
.3. Proof of Lemma 4.2
Proof: Consider non-atomic type users at source node 1
and source node 2 with a total demand rate of r each to be
dispatched to the destination node 3.
Let p ∈ P denote a path that a user can take from
a source node to destination node and Tp(.) denote the
cumulative latency observed for the path. The concept of
road traffic wardrop equilibrium, originally introduced by
Wardrop [16], which is the non-cooperative equilibrium
for non-atomic users in network traffic, is defined in terms
of variational inequality as
Tp(x)−A≥ 0; (Tp(x)−A)xip = 0, for p ∈P, (24)
where A = minp∈P Tp(x).
The Wardrop equilibrium falls into the category of po-
tential games with an infinite number of users and can be
expressed by a single convex optimization [17]. Hence,
there exist a unique equilibrium.
There are two possible paths from source node 1 to
destination node: a) through l1; and, b) through l3 → l2.
Path Similarly, from source node 2 following are the fea-
sible paths: c) through l2; and, d) through l4 → l1. Us-
ing (24), we can easily see that at equilibrium the set
P = {a,c}, i.e., only local links are used. Therefore, the
equilibrium flow is given by x∗ = {x1∗ ,x2∗} = {r,r} and
the latency cost experienced by a user is T1(.) = L and total
cost of users from a source node equals ∑rk=1 T1(.) = rL.
Clearly, the user’s cost is bounded and equal to the
social optimum at Wardrop equilibrium. ⋄
.4. Proof of Proposition 5.1
Proof: In an altruistic routing game, users minimize their
perceived cost ( ˆJi(.)). It is interesting to note that although
the perceived cost is minimized non-cooperatively, the ef-
fect of altruism appears due the coupling through the cost.
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium of this two user game can
be expressed by the following equivalent problem:
P2 : x
i = argmin
x∈X
ˆJi(x), ∀ i = 1,2. (25)
where the perceived cost of users (when user 1 is altruistic)
can be expressed as
ˆJ1(x) = (1−β )J1(x)+β J2(x),
ˆJ2(x) = J2(x).
(26)
Existence of an equilibrium is direct from the compact
strategy set X and concave and continuity of the cost func-
tion ˆJi(x) [15].
In this altruistic equilibrium, we are interested in an
equilibrium which can improve the user’s cost as the self-
ish equilibrium cost is very large. It turns out that the
cost becomes unbounded or large only when a significant
amount of flow is routed thorough cross link, which is the
main reason of inefficiency. Therefore, a bounded cost can
be achieved only when one can restrict almost all the flow
to one’s local link. In this spirit an altruistic game can
achieve the equilibrium flow to be (x11,x22) = (r,r− δ ) for
at least some β , because it can result in bounded cost.
We call xii = r as “load taker” strategy because user
i do not reciprocate (sends back flow) to any flow sent
to him, i.e., takes all the load. Similarly, xii = r− δ is
the so called “delta load taker” strategy as it only pushes
enough flow to the other link so that his local link gets to
the knee, provided the other player doesn’t push back. We
aim to show that (x11,x22) = (load taker,delta load taker) =
(r,r− δ ) is an equilibrium strategy. we use the best re-
sponse approach to show the equilibrium for large enough
m. We user δ and δm alternatively in the proof for ease of
notation.
Computation of BR2(x11) : The cost of u2 for a load
taker strategy of user 1 is given by (let denote p = x22 and
p¯ = r− x22),
J2(p) =
{
p¯[T12(p¯)+T1(r+ p¯)] if p≤ r− δ ,
pT2(p)+ p¯[T12(p¯)+T1(r+ p¯)] if p > r− δ .
(27)
Notice that the J2(p) has discontinuity only at x22 = r− δ .
The marginal cost can be given as
∂J2(p)
∂ p =
{
A(p)< 0 if p≤ r− δ ,
Bm(p)> 0 if p > r− δ ,
(28)
Using (27), we have A(p)=− p¯ Lδ m − [dm+ Lδm (p¯)+L]< 0,
and Bm(p) = (2p−r)Lδm − dm > (r− 2δm)
L
δm − dm. We note
that Bm(p) > 0 for sufficiently large m. Hence, BR2(r) =
r− δ .
Computation of BR1(x22): The cost of u1 for a delta
load taker strategy of u2 is given by (let denote x11 = p and
x22 =
¯δ = r− δ ),
ˆJ1(p) = (1−β )J1(x)+β J2(x)
= (1−β )[pT1(p+ δ )+ p¯(T12(p¯)+T2(p¯+ ¯δ))]
+β [ ¯δT2(p¯+ ¯δ )+ δ (T21(δ )+T1(p+ δ ))](29)
Noting that ˆJ1(p) is strictly convex in p ∈ [0,r], if ∂
ˆJ1
∂ p < 0
at p = r then ∂ ˆJ1∂ p < 0 for p ∈ [0,r]. Therefore, we examine
if ∂ ˆJ1∂ p < 0 holds true at p = r. Taking the derivative of
ˆJ1(p), we have
∂ ˆJ1(p)
∂ p = (1−β )[p(g1(p+ δ )+ g2(p¯+ ¯δ ))+T1(p+ δ )−T2(p¯+ ¯δ )
−(rg2(p¯+ ¯δ)+T12(p¯))]+β [δg1(p+ δ ))− ( ¯δ)g2(p¯+ ¯δ )] (30)
At p = r− (less than and close to r), we have g1(p+ δ ) =
g2( ¯δ + p¯) = Lδm , T1(p+δ ) = L+(p+δ−r)
L
δm , and T2(
¯δ +
p¯) = L+(r− δ − p) Lδm . Plugging the values in (30), we
obtain
∂ ˆJ2(p)
∂ p < 0, for β ∈ Γ (31)
where the set Γ turns out to be a non empty set, given by
( 12 ,1]. Therefore, we can state that BR1(r−δ )= r, for β ∈
Γ.
Therefore, together it constitute the Nash equilibrium.
Denoting the equilibrium flow by x˜AL, and cost of user 1
as J1(x˜AL), we have
x˜AL = (r,r− δ ), for β ∈ Γ, (32)
J1(x˜AL) = rT1(r+ δ ) = 2rL. (33)
The set of equilibria is denoted by xAL when there exist
multiple equilibria. Denote xAL ∈ xAL such that
J1(xAL)< J1(x), for anyx ∈ xAL. (34)
Computation of VoU : Using (19) and (33), and the
definition 5.2, we can express
VoU(1) = Ji(x
SE)
inf(~αi,xAL~αi )
Ji(xAL~αi )
>
J1(xSE)
J1(x˜AL)
=
rL+(r/2− ζm)cm
2rL
. (35)
The last inequality is from (51). The quantity
rL+(r/2−ζm)cm
2rL can be arbitrarily large for large m. This
concludes the proof.
⋄
.5. Proof of Lemma 6.1
Proof: In order to compute PoA, we need to compute the
worst equilibrium cost for selfish user and the cost at social
optimum. To do so, We go in the following steps:
1. We show that there exist unique Nash equilibrium for
selfish users.
2. Since there can be only one equilibrium, we exploit
the symmetric property and compute the Nash equi-
librium. Obviously, this can be used for worst equi-
librium cost of PoA computation.
3. Finally, we note that the social optimum is unique,
the PoA follows by directly comparing the ration of
selfish equilibrium and social optimum.
In the following, we go step by step.
We allowed arbitrary number of node and a user as-
sociated with each user, as shown in Figs. 3. The Nash
equilibrium for the selfish game corresponds to the solu-
tion to the following minimization problem
P1 : x
i∗ = argmin
x∈X
Ji(x), ∀ i = 1, · · · ,n. (36)
The cost of user a i in the above equation can be expressed
as:
Ji(x) = xiiTi(xi)+ x¯ii(Ti j(x¯ii)+Tj(x j)),
for i 6= j = 1, · · · ,n. (37)
Where, x¯ii = ri− xii .
We show the existence of unique Nash equilibrium by
transforming our problem into parallel link network prob-
lem with arbitrary number of users, for which it known to
exist unique Nash equilibrium (see [1, Theorem 1.]).
Consider a network consisting of two nodes: a and b,
and of I parallel directed links, all from node a to node b.
There are i users, i = 1, · · · , I, having node a as the source
node and node b as the destination node. The total demand
rate for user i is ri.
Let xil be the rate at which user i sends over the
link l, (l = 1, · · · , I, which satisfy the positive flow con-
straint, xil ≥ 0, ∀l and ∑l xil = ri. User i determines
(xi1, · · · ,x
i
I) so as to minimize his cost Ji(x) where x =
(xil , l ∈ (1, · · · , I), i ∈I ). Define xl = ∑i xil .
We assume that J(x) is the sum of the link cost func-
tions: Ji(x) =∑l Jli (x), where J pi (x) are expressed in terms
of the cost Jli (x), defined in the original problem, as fol-
lows. For any l and any i,
Jii(x) = Jii (xii,xi)
J ji (x) = J
i j
i (x
i
j,x j)+ J
j
i (x
i
j,x j), ∀ j 6= i.
recall that Jii represent cost of user i in its local link i and
the corresponding flow is xii.
We note that the cost function of the original problem
satisfies the following assumptions (as that in [1]):
G1. Ji(x) is the sum of the link costs incurred in each link,
i.e.,
Ji(x) = ∑
l
Jli (x)
G2. Jli (x) is continuous (piecewise continuous with our
elbow latency function, which suffice the condition)
functions whose range is the nonnegative quadrant
and their image is [0,∞].
G3. Jli are convex functions in the rate sent by user i over
link l.
G4. Whenever finite, Jli is continuously differentiable in
the flow sent by user i to link l. The marginal cost is
denoted by Kli (x) =
∂Jli (x)
∂xli
.
G5. If not all users have finite cost and one user user has
infinite cost then it can change its own flow o make
this cost finite. This ensures that at any equilibrium
users have finite cost if it is feasible.
The following assumption is also satisfied by Ji(x), which
is very important for uniqueness ( [1]):
Π1 Kli (.) is function of two arguments: i) the total flow
on the link l, xl and ii) the flow of user i on link l,
xli . Kli (xli ,xi) is strictly increasing in both of its argu-
ments.
.5.1. Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. If the cost of
original problem with LB network satisfy the assumption
(Π1), it follows that the costs for the new routing prob-
lem also do satisfy the assumption (Π1). The new routing
problem has a unique Nash equilibrium under the assump-
tions (Π1) (see Theorem 1 in [1]). By identifying the de-
cision variable x in the new routing problem with the de-
cision variable x of the original problem with LB network,
we see that the minimization problem faced by each user
is same in both the cases, and therefore we conclude that
user optimum in our problem is also unique. Note that the
although we considered a symmetric network, the proof
holds good for non symmetric LB network also.
.5.2. Computation of equilibrium. Since all the users
have identical demands and facing identical network con-
ditions, the users will have identical strategy at equilib-
rium. Such equilibrium are often called as symmetric equi-
librium. Let xii be the equilibrium strategy of user i, the
flow in his local link, and x ji is the flow in a cross link to
user j.
Let us compute the best response of user i for the strat-
egy of user j 6= i. Let xii be user i’s best response for the
strategy of user j be x jj. Note that we consider that all the
other user’s have identical strategy(x jj). Therefore, the best
response of user i is given by
BRi(x jj,n) = argmin
xi∈X
Ji(x). (38)
The cost of user i is given by,
Ji(xii,x
j
j) = xi[Ti(x
j
i +(r− x
j
j))]
+∑
j 6=i
x¯ii
n− 1
[cm(
x¯ii
n− 1
)+Tj(x jj +
(r− xii)
n− 1
)+
(n− 2)(r− xkk)
n− 1
)].
where k 6= i, j. The derivative of Ji(.) is (denote p = xii)
∂Ji(p,x jj)
∂ p = pgi(p+ r− x
j
j)+Ti(p+ r− x
j
j)
− p¯
[
g j
(
x
j
j +
(r− p)
n− 1
+
r− xkk
n− 1
)]
−
[
cm +Tj
(
x
j
j +
(n− 2)x¯kk + p¯
n− 1
)]
,
= p[gi(xi)+ g j(x j)]+ [Ti(xi)−Tj(x j)]− (rg j(x j)+ cm).
Due to symmetric structure, we note that xi = x( j 6=i) = r.
Thus, we have Ti(xi)−Tj(x j) = 0 and gi(xi) = g j(x j) = g.
Therefore,
BRi(x jj) =
cm + rg
2g
=
1
2
[
r+
cm
L/δm
]
= r/2+ ζm.
Since all the users are symmetric, the equilibrium strategy
of any user is same. Therefore, the equilibrium strategy
and the equilibrium cost of a user i can be given by
xi
SE
i = r/2+ ζm,
JSEi = rL+
( r
2
− ζm
)
(cm) .
(39)
One can directly observe that at social optimum
(OPT) only local links are used. Therefore, the user cost
JOPTi at social optima is given as
JOPTi = rTi(r) = rL, ∀ i. (40)
.5.3. Computation of PoA. Therefore the price of anar-
chy can be expressed as
PoA = sup
m
∑i rL+( r2 − ζm)(cm)
∑i rL
= 1+ sup
m
( r2 − ζm)(cm)
rL
. (41)
Evidently, the PoA can be arbitrarily large for sufficiently
large m. This concludes the proof. ⋄
.6. Proof of Proposition 6.1
Proof: The equivalent problem for the n user altruistic
routing game considered can be expressed as (similar as
in proposition 5.1)
Pn : x
i = argmin
x∈X
ˆJi(x), ∀ i = 1, · · · ,n. (42)
where the perceived cost of users (when user i is altruistic)
can be given by
ˆJi(x) = ∑n(k=1) α ikJk(x). (43)
Existence of an equilibrium is direct from the compact
strategy set X and concave and continuity of the cost func-
tion ˆJi(x) [15]. Following the approach of proposition 5.1,
we show that the load taker strategy of altruistic user and
delta load taker strategy of other users constitutes a Nash
equilibrium. Since this equilibrium yields a bounded cost
for altruistic user, VoU is be arbitrarily large for large m.
Let index altruistic user by i and selfish users by j(6=
i) = 1, · · · ,n. We compute the best response for both type
users.
Computation of BR j(xii = r) : The cost of a selfish
user (u j) for a load taker strategy of user i is given by (let
denote p = xij, p¯ = r− xij = x
j
j, and xkj = q, k 6= i, j),
J j(p¯) = p¯[Tj(p¯)+ (n− 2)qTk(p¯)+ (n− 2)qTjk(q)
+pTi(r+(n− 1)p)+ pTji(p)]
Since the latency function is discontinuous, the cost func-
tion can be re-expressed as follows
J j(p¯)=


p[Ti(r+(n− 1)p)+ cm]+ (n− 2)qcm if p¯≥ r− δ ,
p¯Tj(p¯)+ (n− 2)qTk(p¯)+ (n− 2)qcm
+p[Ti(r+(n− 1)p)+Tji(p)] if p > r− δ .
(44)
Noting the discontinuity only at x jj = r− δ , the marginal
cost can be given as
∂J j(p¯)
∂ p¯ =
{
A1(p¯)< 0 if p¯≥ r− δ ,
B1m(p¯)> 0 if p¯ < r− δ ,
(45)
Using (44), we have A1(p¯) =−p Lδ m − pTi(r+(n−1)p)<
0, and B1m(p¯) =
(2 p¯−r)L
δm + (n− 2)
L
δm − cm − (Ti(r + (n−
1)p)−Tj(p¯)).We note that B1m(p)> 0 for sufficiently large
m. Hence, the best response is a delta load taker strategy,
i.e., BR j(r) = r− δ .
Computation of BRi(x jj = r− δ ): The cost of the al-
truistic user (ui) for a delta load taker strategy of u j is given
by (let denote xii = p and x jj = r− δ = ¯δ ),
ˆJi(p) = (1−β )Ji(x)+ (n− 1) β
(n− 1)
J j(x)
= (1−β )[pTi(p+(n− 1)δ )+ (n−1) p¯
n−1
(Ti j(
p¯
n− 1
)
+Tj(
p¯
n− 1
+ ¯δ))]+β [ ¯δTj( p¯
n− 1
+ ¯δ)
+δ (Tji(δ )+Ti(p+ δ (n− 1)))].(46)
Noting that ˆJi(p) is convex in p ∈ [0,r], if ∂
ˆJi
∂ p < 0 at p =
r− (less than and close to r) then ∂ ˆJi∂ p < 0 for p ∈ [0,r].
Therefore, below we examine if ∂ ˆJi∂ p < 0 holds true at p =
r−. The derivative of ˆJi(p) is
∂ ˆJi(p)
∂ p = (1−β )[p(gi(p+(n− 1)δ )+ g j(
p¯
n− 1
+ ¯δ))
+Ti(p+(n− 1)δ )−Tj(
p¯
n− 1
+ ¯δ)− (rg j(
p¯
n− 1
+ ¯δ)
+Ti j(
p¯
n− 1
))]+β [δgi(p+ δ (n− 1)))− ( ¯δ)g j( p¯
n− 1
+ ¯δ )].(47)
Plugging the values of g(.) and T (.) in (47), we obtain
∂ ˆJi(p)
∂ p < 0, for β ∈ Γ (48)
where the set Γ = ( 1
n
,1]. Hence, we can state that BRi(r−
δ ) = r, for β ∈ Γ.
Therefore, together it constitute the Nash equilibrium.
Denoting the equilibrium flow by x˜AL, and cost of user i as
Ji(x˜AL), we have
x˜AL = (r,r− δ ), for β ∈ Γ, (49)
Ji(x˜AL) = rTi(r+ δ ) = rL. (50)
The set of equilibria is denoted by xAL when there exist
multiple equilibria. Denote xAL ∈ xAL such that
Ji(xAL)< Ji(x), for anyx ∈ xAL. (51)
Computation of VoU : Using (19) and (50), and the
definition 5.2, we can express
VoU(i) =
Ji(xSE)
inf(~αi,xAL~αi )
Ji(xAL~αi )
>
J1(xSE)
Ji(x˜AL)
=
rL+(r/2− ζm)cm
2rL
. (52)
The last inequality is from (51). The quantity
rL+(r/2−ζm)cm
2rL can be arbitrarily large for large m. This
concludes the proof.
⋄
